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Following the amputation of a limb, many amputees report that they can still vividly perceive
its presence despite conscious knowledge that it is not physically there. However, our abil-
ity to probe the mental representation of this experience is limited by the intractable and
often distressing pain associated with amputation. Here, we present a method for eliciting
phantom-like experiences in non-amputees using a variation of the rubber hand illusion in
which a finger has been removed from the rubber hand. An interpretative phenomenolog-
ical analysis revealed that the structure of this experience shares a wide range of sensory
attributes with subjective reports of phantom limb experience. For example, when the
space where the ring finger should have been on the rubber hand was stroked, 93% of
participants (i.e., 28/30) reported the vivid presence of a finger that they could not see and
a total of 57% (16/28) of participants who felt that the finger was present reported one or
more additional sensory qualities such as tingling or numbness (25%; 7/28) and alteration
in the perceived size of the finger (50%; 14/28). These experiences indicate the adaptabil-
ity of body experience and share some characteristics of the way that phantom limbs are
described. Participants attributed changes to the shape and size of their “missing” finger
to the way in which the experimenter mimed stroking in the area occupied by the miss-
ing finger. This alteration of body perception is similar to the phenomenon of telescoping
experienced by people with phantom limbs and suggests that our sense of embodiment
not only depends on internal body representations but on perceptual information coming
from peripersonal space.
Keywords: amputation, embodied experience, interpretative phenomenological analysis, peripersonal space,
phantom limb, proprioception, rubber hand illusion
INTRODUCTION
The sense of one’s own body is largely determined by the multisen-
sory integration of visual, tactile, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic
(and possibly auditory) information. Multisensory information
about the body comes not only from the body itself, but also
from the surrounding environment with which the body inter-
acts. Though we are aware of the resulting sense of embodiment,
we are not normally aware of the multisensory integration that
produces it. This is only revealed in abnormal situations, such as
body illusions, of which the rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998) is a striking example, and pathological phe-
nomena, such as the experience of phantom limbs. Given that
the RHI and phantom limbs both result from the alteration of
the sensory input that creates the sense of embodiment, the goal
of the present paper was, firstly, to determine whether an analog
of the phantom limb experience could be created in participants
without an amputation through a variation of the RHI. Secondly,
we wanted to demonstrate the usefulness of first-person method-
ology in investigating the experience of embodiment. Although
embodiment has been the subject of a wealth studies investi-
gating normal body representation (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Armel and Ramachandran, 2003), only a handful of stud-
ies have sought to understand the phenomenological aspects and
determinants of subjective experience underlying abnormal body
representations, such as phantom limbs. Such investigations are
rare because they are difficult to carry out: the phantom limb
is often a transitory phenomenon and, even when it is rela-
tively long-lasting, the experience of pain that is associated with
it makes it difficult for patients to reflect analytically on their
experience of the phantom limb. The ability to create an ana-
log of the phantom limb experience in intact participants could,
therefore, prove to be an important tool in investigating the sense
of embodiment and how it relies upon our interaction with the
environment.
Our sense of embodiment depends on both bottom-up factors,
in the form of incoming sensory information, and on top-down
factors, such as the body schema. The body schema acts as a con-
straint on the sensory processes that underpin body representation
by forming a tacit expectation of the body’s possible movements
(Head and Holmes, 1911; Cardinali et al., 2009). Previous studies
have shown that when the expectation of the body schema is vio-
lated (as in the case of paralyzed limbs) this may, in some cases, lead
to discomfort and a sense of “disownership” of the limb (Moseley
et al., 2008) so that the person no longer feels that the limb belongs
to them. Embodiment, therefore, can be seen as dependent on the
functional capabilities of the body: if the body part is no longer in
use or useful then it may become “disowned.” This holistic sense
of self arises through the interaction between the representation of
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the body modified though multisensory integration and the per-
ception of being in control of the body (i.e., the sense of agency),
which forms judgments of self-attribution and limb ownership.
However, this holistic embodiment breaks down when alter-
ations in body representation occur through neural damage or
through a perceptual illusion. For example, in the RHI, a viewed
prosthetic hand is stroked in precise spatial and temporal syn-
chrony with the stroking of a participant’s concealed hand. The
majority of people report perceiving the touch from the rubber
hand as if it were part of their own body. In other words, a “sense”
of embodiment is transferred to an external object and the real
hand is disowned. The subjective experience of this feeling of own-
ership over the rubber hand has generally been measured using
self-report questionnaires (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Armel
and Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005, 2008; Mussap
and Salton,2006; Schaefer et al., 2006; Durgin et al., 2007; Kitadono
and Humphreys, 2007; Lloyd, 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Haans
et al., 2008; Longo et al., 2008; Moseley et al., 2008; Capelari et al.,
2009; Dummer et al., 2009; Kammers et al., 2009; Schütz-Bosbach
et al., 2009; Shimada et al., 2009). Several authors have argued
that the feeling of ownership over the rubber hand is induced
because vision and touch capture converging, correlated informa-
tion and this forms a meaningful percept, i.e., the visual perception
of a hand being touched co-occurs with the tactile sensation of
the hand being touched. This perception becomes dominant, and
the conflicting proprioceptive information, which indicates the
true position of the participant’s hidden hand, is adapted leading
to proprioceptive distortion (measured as the distance the intact
hand is believed to have moved from its original starting point
toward the rubber hand). Human functional neuroimaging studies
have revealed that visual, tactile, and proprioceptive inputs relat-
ing to limb position are integrated in the premotor and parietal
cortices (Lloyd et al., 2002) and the degree of premotor activation
shows a linear relationship to how participants subjectively rate
the illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005).
The RHI demonstrates that the sense of embodiment is strongly
influenced by the sensory information produced through interac-
tion with the environment. In the case of the RHI, it is not only
proprioceptive information generated internally by the body, but
also visual and tactile information generated through interaction
with the experimenter, that results in an altered sense of embodi-
ment. Indeed, as we have seen, the proprioceptive sense is actually
distorted so that it fits to a greater extent with the visual and tactile
information. The idea that the relationship between the body and
the world is integral to the overall sense of embodiment (i.e., we
get a sense of our own bodies via their interaction with the world)
also helps to make sense of other phenomena. In asomatognosia,
for example, in which patients have no sense of ownership over
one of their limbs, placing the neglected limb into the attended
(i.e., contralateral) body space restores multisensory processing
(Moro et al., 2004). In complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS),
not only does the affected limb feel cooler but that whole side
of space is physiologically dysregulated as when the affected limb
was moved to the opposite side of space it got warmer (similarly
when the “good hand” moved to the affected side of space it got
cooler; Moseley et al., 2012). These clinical findings point to the
same conclusion as experimental studies of the RHI: our sense of
embodiment is dynamic and dependent on the body’s positioning
within the space that surrounds it.
Peripersonal space is the region surrounding the body that acts
as the interface between the body and the environment for defen-
sive and purposeful action (Cardinali et al., 2009). Neurophysiolo-
gists have defined peripersonal space based on the spatial limits of
visual receptive fields of individual neurons most often found in
the parietal and premotor cortices of non-human primates (e.g.,
Graziano et al., 1997). For example, in monkey posterior parietal
cortex, peripersonal space encoding involves ventral intraparietal
area, which contains visuotactile bimodal cells for the face, arm,
and hand. These cells use a body-part-centered reference frame to
represent visual space around the body, such that the visual recep-
tive field of the bimodal cell is bound to the space surrounding the
tactile receptive field of a particular body part. Visual signals from
a region of the body can therefore activate a somatotopic map
relating to that body part and can remap with changes in posture
(Graziano and Gross, 1994). Recent evidence from a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study suggests that intrapari-
etal areas similarly encode objects in the peripersonal hand space
of humans and may also have a role in visually guided grasping
(Makin et al., 2007). Thus, in addition to spatial location influenc-
ing our sense of embodiment, the body plays a role in structuring
peripersonal space (i.e., it is body-part-centered). There are, in
other words, reciprocal relations of influence between the sense of
our bodies and our perception of peripersonal space.
One of the ways in which we can get a handle on the sense
of embodiment and how it arises is through the investigation of
abnormal embodiment. In cases such as these, the normally“invis-
ible” processes that underlie embodiment become more appar-
ent than is usually the case. One of the most striking forms of
abnormal embodiment is the phantom limb. Ambroise Paré first
reported phantom phenomena in amputee soldiers in the mid
sixteenth century. However, it wasn’t until Silas Weir Mitchell pub-
lished the first detailed study (where the term“phantom”was used)
in the nineteenth century that phantom limb phenomena (PLPh)
became recognized as real sensory experiences and not psychiatric
symptoms (Mitchell, 1871). PLPh have been defined as a “contin-
uous awareness of a (or part of a) non-existing or de-afferented
body part with specific form, weight, or range of motion” (Rib-
bers et al., 1989) and have been reported not only in amputees,
but also in paraplegics and people with a congenital absence of
limbs (Melzack and Loeser, 1978). PLPh may be felt as pins and
needles, itching, tingling, or numbness (Katz, 1992; Montoya et al.,
1997) whereas others experience embodiment without sensation
(i.e., they know that the phantom is there but have no feeling in
it – Hunter et al., 2003; Richardson et al., 2006). Movement and
position sense may also remain intact in the phantom limb and
can be spontaneous (i.e., spasm) or volitional. For example, some
patients report gesturing during conversations and can carry out
finger-aided counting (Ramachandran, 1993; Saadah and Melzack,
1994; Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998; Brugger et al., 2000).
Some patients also report the sensation of telescoping, in which
the phantom shortens over time until only the digits remain on the
end of the stump (Weiss and Fishman, 1963; Jensen et al., 1984).
There may also be super-added sensations of feeling a watch on the
arm or clothing against the phantom skin (Wesolowski and Lema,
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1993) indicating that memory systems may help to maintain the
phantom experience (Katz and Melzack, 1990; Richardson et al.,
2006).
Capturing the subjective experience of embodiment, whether
that be the experience of phantom limbs or the RHI, tends to
rely on self-report questionnaires using Likert scales in which
participants rate their level of agreement or disagreement with
statements describing the experience (e.g., “the rubber hand feels
like my hand”). But these questionnaires, which use a limited range
of items, may have obscured the important subcomponents of
embodied experience. A more rigorous analysis of first-person
accounts can provide a scientific description of the phenomena
and serve as the basis for quantification. An excellent example of
this is a study of the alien hand experiment (TAHE) by Sørensen
(2005); first reported by Nielsen (1963). In TAHE, the participant
is asked to draw a series of objects, which he/she can only see
via a tilted mirror. On some trials, the mirror is tilted in such a
way that the participant actually sees the experimenter draw the
object instead, giving the subjective experience that the partici-
pant is not in control of their body. By using first-person reports
of the phenomena as experienced by the participant, categories
for quantification were disclosed by the data themselves and it was
possible to show that concepts such as agency and body schema
do reflect real phenomenological aspects of experience.
A more recent study confirmed the utility of first-person meth-
ods for the study of embodiment. First-person accounts of subjec-
tive experience during the RHI were analyzed using interpretative
phenomenological analysis (IPA; Lewis and Lloyd, 2010). IPA has
its roots in symbolic interactionism; as such, it is concerned with
how meanings are constructed by individuals both on a social and
personal basis (Smith and Osborne, 2007). People may experi-
ence the same objective event but the meanings that each person
attaches to it may be very different, and these personal meanings
and feelings will be reflected in the language used to describe the
experiences. In IPA, the researcher attempts to find the themes
and categories that emerge naturally from the freely produced dis-
course of participants rather than imposing a preconceived set of
categories on participants’ responses. Such an approach is advan-
tageous for investigations of novel phenomena, such as the RHI
and PLPh, which may never have been experienced before, and
therefore require an open and flexible approach to the language
used by participants. In the study by Lewis and Lloyd (2010)
IPA revealed four main themes of embodied experience during
the RHI: recalibration of the body schema; violation of the body
schema; multisensory integration; and illusory experience over
time. Furthermore, the report of agency was a significant predic-
tor of the amount (in centimeters) of proprioceptive distortion.
This study shows how first-person methodologies can be empiri-
cally rigorous and how the introspective interview provides a rich,
detailed account of embodied experience.
The aim of the present study was to establish, through the use
of first-person phenomenological methods, whether an analog of
the subjective experience of a phantom limb could be induced in
intact participants by having them take part in a modified version
of the RHI. We manipulated the RHI paradigm by removing the
ring finger from a right rubber hand. Through this manipulation
we aimed to discover whether participants, after being induced to
feel ownership over the rubber hand, would feel the presence of the
absent finger in a way analogous to the feeling of a phantom limb.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty right-handed participants (13 males, 17 females; aged 19–
29 years, mean age of 22.5 years) were recruited from the Uni-
versity of Manchester via opportunity sampling. The study was
approved by the School of Psychological Sciences research ethics
committee. Participants were screened for tactile and propriocep-
tive impairments of the right hand. They received five pounds
compensation for their time.
MATERIALS
Participants sat at a table across from the experimenter and
placed their right hand inside a specially constructed box
(40 cm× 27 cm× 7 cm; Figure 1A). The ring finger of their right
hand was placed on a predetermined spot concealed from view.
The side of the box facing the experimenter was open so that
the experimenter could stroke the participant’s hand. A pros-
thetic (right) rubber hand was placed palm down on top of the
box so that there was a 10 cm horizontal separation between
the rubber hand and the participant’s real hand. The rubber
hand used in the standard RHI condition was intact and the
rubber hand used in the missing finger condition was identi-
cal except that the ring finger had been cut off prior to the
experiment.
The rubber hand was placed in full view of the participant and
covered from the wrist by a fake sleeve so that it was a plausi-
ble extension of the participant’s right arm. A second larger box
with a hidden ruler (46 cm× 27 cm× 12 cm; Figure 1B) was used
to conceal the equipment and take proprioceptive measurements.
Both boxes were covered with felt to conceal any distinguishing
marks which may have aided localization.
PROCEDURE
Participants took part in both the standard RHI and the miss-
ing finger versions. Participants took part in the intact version of
FIGURE 1 | (A) Participants viewed a rubber hand with a missing finger on
top of an open-sided box while their real hand was hidden from view
beneath the box. The experimenter stroked both the real and the rubber
hand simultaneously through one of the box’s open sides; (B) A larger box
with a ruler was used to measure participants’ estimates of the position of
their real hand on the basis of proprioception alone. This was done before
and after inducement of the RHI and only the experimenter, seated
opposite the participant, could see the markings on the ruler.
www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 600 | 3
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lewis et al. Invisible finger
the illusion first as it was necessary to establish the basic illusion
before the missing finger variation was performed. As it was the
missing finger version that was the focus of interest, this order
of presentation had the additional benefit of getting participants
used to talking about the illusion. Participants had a 2–3 min break
between the illusions where they were allowed to move freely. In
both conditions, participants placed their right hand inside the
apparatus while their left hand rested comfortably on the table
beside the apparatus. Participants were informed that they would
take part in an illusion and that they should describe their expe-
rience of this illusion as fully as possible. In addition, they were
asked to watch the rubber hand and keep their right hand still.
A single initial proprioceptive measure was obtained by placing
the larger box over the equipment and sliding a marker across the
hidden ruler until the participant indicated that it was over the
location of their ring finger. Then the audio recorder was started.
In both conditions the fingers of the rubber hand (excluding the
ring finger) were stroked simultaneously with the participant’s
own fingers. If the participants did not provide a description of
their experience after 1.5 min they were asked to describe how they
felt about the rubber hand while they watched it being stroked.
The RHI was considered established when the participant stated
that either “the rubber hand felt like their hand,” “the touch was
felt in the rubber hand,” or they felt that they could “move the
rubber hand volitionally.” Then the experimenter stroked the ring
fingers simultaneously. During the missing finger condition, the
experimenter mimed the stroking of a finger in the empty space
that would have been occupied by the ring finger of the rubber
hand while simultaneously stroking the participant’s ring finger.
Participants were reminded to describe their experience of the
illusion. To encourage this they were prompted with the follow-
ing questions: how does this feel? How do you feel about your
real hand? Is this a comfortable experience? The questions were
purposefully vague and their order was not fixed. After 3 min, a
second proprioceptive measure was taken in the same manner as
the first.
ANALYSIS
Audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA: Smith, 1996;
Smith et al., 1999).
Transcripts were analyzed individually using a two stage process
(Figure 2 illustrates the elements of this analysis). After familiar-
ization with a transcript, the left margin was used to code the
themes of the adjoining parts of the transcript. Then, similar or
related codes were collapsed into broader themes, which were
noted in the margin on the right. Once this was complete for
every transcript the data were considered as a whole. Variations in
themes across transcripts were used to establish broader themes
which could demonstrate the structure of the experience across
the entire sample. Specifically, the themes highlighted differences
between the transcripts in each condition. Themes are presented
with examples of the participants’ discourse as evidence as well
as the identifying number for that participant in parentheses after
each example of discourse. Quantitative measures of propriocep-
tive distortion were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA)
and SPSS v.16.
FIGURE 2 |The processes involved in Interpretative Phenomenological
Analysis. The researcher will go through as many iterations of this cycle as
he/she feels is necessary to capture adequately the themes and
sub-themes that emerge from participants’ discourse.
RESULTS
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
A 2× 2 repeated measures ANOVA (before/after illusion× finger-
absent RHI/finger-present RHI) was conducted to assess whether
proprioceptive judgments of the position of the ring finger of the
right hand were shifted away from its objective position before
and after each illusion (finger-present vs. finger-absent). There
was a significant main effect of the time point of the proprio-
ceptive measure [F(1, 29)= 221.34, p< 0.001], but there was no
main effect of finger presence (F < 1) or an interaction between
the time point and finger presence [F(1, 29)= 1.41, p= 0.245].
Participants judged their finger to be significantly further away
from its actual location after the illusion (presentM = 7.03 cm, SD
2.27 cm vs. absentM = 6.80 cm, SD 3.13 cm) than they did at base-
line (presentM = 1.23 cm, SD 1.61 cm vs. absentM = 1.63 cm, SD
1.71 cm) but the presence or absence of the finger did not influence
the proprioceptive judgments (See Figure 3).
QUALITATIVE RESULTS
Theme 1: “My invisible finger” – an altered body form changes the
effect of multisensory integration on somatic experience
When the intact fingers of the rubber hand were stroked, the par-
ticipants’ descriptions were the same in both conditions and their
comments reflected the experience associated with the standard
RHI. They described how the rubber hand felt as though it was
their hand or the touch sensations felt located in the rubber hand,
whilst their awareness of their own hand had diminished. During
the missing finger condition, participants stated that they could
still perceive their ring finger even though it was missing on the
rubber hand. Many participants believed that this was the aim of
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FIGURE 3 |The difference (in cm) between participants’ proprioceptive
estimate of their hidden finger’s position before and after induction of
each version of the RHI.
the experiment and emphasized that they could be fooled into
owning another hand but they could not be fooled into perceiving
their finger as absent. So just seeing and feeling ownership over an
altered body form – in this case the rubber hand with a missing
finger – does not induce changes in the phenomenal experience of
body form; the hand is still experienced as intact:
“It feels like this (rubber) hand is my hand again. . .like my
hand is up there. But it doesn’t feel like I’m missing a finger, it
doesn’t feel like my finger disappears or anything. It still feels
the same as normal.” (4)
When the missing finger area was stroked simultaneously with the
participants’ ring finger, 93% of participants (i.e., 28/30) reported
that they could perceive their ring finger extending out from the
stump on the rubber hand even though they could see that it
was not there. They discounted the visual information indicating
that the finger was missing and the correspondence of tactile cues
and visual information from the mimed stroking was sufficient to
elicit a percept of their ring finger. The finger was predominantly
described as “invisible” or using a metaphor to convey a physical
entity which cannot be seen, for example, “my finger is made of
glass” or “painted to match the color of the box.” Two of the par-
ticipants described an alternative experience of the illusion: when
the area of the missing finger was stroked they instantly reported
a holistic shift in awareness to their hidden hand. The following
quotes demonstrate these two contrasting ways of describing the
illusion
“Oh my god, I just felt like my hand was invisible! The finger
isn’t there but I feel like it should be so I feel like it is there,
I just can’t see it. The rubber hand before felt like it was my
hand and this also feels like it is my hand. I just feel like Harry
Potter’s invisibility cloak has been draped over my ring finger.
It is there I just can’t see it. I feel like if I moved my finger
toward it I would be able to touch it even though it is not
there. Even though I can’t see it, it doesn’t feel like its missing
or not there.” (2)
“I was getting the feeling that this rubber hand was my
real hand but as soon as I can see that I don’t have a finger
here, I can get the feeling of my (actual) hand, it suddenly
changes. . .You get your normal state of mind back when you
can see that you don’t have a finger there even when you can
get the feeling there.” (29)
The majority of participants described their RHI experience as
being akin to their normal somatic experience and they remarked
that they could “actually feel the finger.” But 25% of the partici-
pants (7/28) also reported a reduction in sensation or an increase
in somatic intensity, pins and needles, or numbness when they
could perceive an invisible finger:
“It feels a bit tingly but it feels like you are still carrying
on (stroking) down the finger. I don’t know if, because I’m
watching it, I tense up, but it feels more strained or tingly.”
(4)
“I don’t feel the sensations as much as before. I definitely
feel a loss of sensation at that point (the stump). My finger
feels numb.” (9)
Theme 2: The dynamic relationship between the environment and
the mental representation of the body is altered in the missing finger
illusion
During the RHI, the participants’ sense of embodiment is changed
by manipulating the sensory input generated by interaction with
the environment. In the missing finger illusion the seen location
of mimed finger stroking can determine the perceived “physi-
cal” qualities of the missing finger. It was difficult to trace the
outline of the finger perfectly and slight, unintentional vari-
ations in the experimenter’s precise stroking action naturally
arose in the course of individual testing sessions. These varia-
tions influenced the perceived shape of the invisible finger. When
the experimenter’s stroking finger was seen to deviate from the
expected shape of a finger, the participants reported that their
invisible finger had changed shape, for example, by becoming
longer or flatter etc. This was spontaneously reported by 50%
of the participants (14/28) and the number of participants that
reported different types of alteration in finger shape is given in
Figure 4.
The following quote is illustrative of some participants’ sponta-
neous reaction to variations in the mimed stroking of the missing
finger:
“Arrgh! That totally felt out in space. That was amazing. It’s
just so compelling. . .but it feels like the invisible finger is kind
of less solid than my other fingers, it’s kind of a bit squashier.
Cos I’m looking very closely, I can see it’s very hard for you
to trace a finger realistically, but I’m kind of adopting that, so
my invisible finger isn’t as solid as the other fingers around
it.” (6)
The changes in form could be quite large, for example, the fin-
ger could be perceptually extended by 3 cm to the edge of the
experimental equipment. But the experiences reported were not
limited to perceived shape differences. For example, some partici-
pants attributed the changes to their own active movements even
though they were not moving. In addition, changes to the shape of
the invisible finger were, in two participants, also associated with
changes to perception of the rest of the hand. The seen location of
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FIGURE 4 | A Venn illustrating the proportion of participants who
described their feeling of the missing finger in various ways. A
definition of each characteristic emerged from the qualitative analysis and
was subsequently used to quantify the proportion of participants who
reported each characteristic. The number of participants who reported each
adjective is presented below in brackets. The white circle represents the 28
participants who described their ring finger as invisible (20), or used another
metaphor to describe something with a physical presence without a visual
image, e.g., a camouflaged finger (8). The dark gray circle represents the 14
participants who reported an invisible finger which had a malleable shape
and size. These participants reported the following adjectives when
comparing their invisible finger percept to normal embodiment or their
experience during the RHI: longer (7), extending (2), stretching (2), flatter
(2), bumpier (1), squashier (1), swollen (1), clenched fingers (1). The light
gray circle represents the seven participants who reported additional
sensations in their invisible finger. These participants reported the following
adjectives when comparing their invisible finger percept to normal
embodiment or their experience during the RHI: tingly (2), more intense (4),
numb (3), tense (2), aching (1), cold (1), heavy (1). The region of gray overlap
represents the five participants who reported an invisible finger which was
both malleable in form and had additional sensations.
interaction, therefore, sometimes had a holistic effect on the whole
hand representation and not just on the invisible finger:
“There I felt like my finger was reaching out quite a long way.
I’ve basically got a big long ghost finger and it goes up to the
boundary of wherever you make it go. That felt like my finger
was really extended out, like the other fingers are clenched
in a bit. I felt like I was pushing that (ring) finger out really
far, like that one was extended and the others were kind of
flexed.” (6)
Perceived changes in the form of the hand were not reported dur-
ing the standard RHI. When comparing the two conditions, the
standard RHI was described as “normal” or “not unusual.” There
was a range of reactions to the missing finger condition. No partic-
ipants reported a painful or uncomfortable experience but some
did experience it as aversive. The participants were aware that their
experiences were illusory but this did not diminish their impact. It
was possible to experience an invisible finger but the participants
described it as being accompanied by a sense of wrongness or as
somehow being invalid. They were motivated to resolve the con-
flict between the visible absence of the finger and the felt presence
of touch through active movement:
“When you stroked up to the stump, it felt about right and
then I was almost expecting not to feel anything (past the
stump), as ridiculous as that sounds. And when I still felt it, it
was like an extreme sense of wrongness to be honest. Almost
like I immediately wanted to move and shake my hand. The
urge to move is quite marked. I’d say it was frustrating in that
my immediate reaction would be to clench and unclench my
fist to make sure everything is working.” (11)
In fact, two participants not only felt this urge to move their fingers
but actually removed their hand from the equipment.
During the standard RHI, participants often report that they
feel as though their hand has taken on the rubbery texture of the
rubber hand. Cross modal texture effects were also reported in the
missing finger condition; however, these related to textures within
the environment as opposed to the surface texture of the body.
Two participants reported that they could feel the felt covered sur-
face of the box on which the rubber hand was resting even though
their hand was resting on the smooth surface of the table:
“When you were pressing down, I actually felt (that) it should
hurt more than that because you went so low into the table;
like my invisible finger was being pressed but then it wasn’t.
It’s very realistic. When you press on the fingernail at the
end. . .that very much feels like I’m pressing into the felty
surface. So now I can really feel it on the felty stuff.” (6)
DISCUSSION
In both versions of the RHI, finger-present and finger-absent,
errors in the proprioceptive judgments of finger position were
larger (i.e., closer to the position of the rubber hand) after the
induction of the illusion than they were prior to the induction
of the illusion. There was no significant difference in judgments
about finger location between the two forms of the illusion, and
so both elicited a similar amount of proprioceptive adaptation.
Even when there was no rubber finger to embody in the missing
finger condition, the participants felt their real finger to be located
in the area where the missing finger would have been. First-person
reports confirmed that participants felt their finger protruding
from the stump of the rubber hand and that they could feel an
“invisible finger” in the location where the missing finger would
have been. Although perceived finger location was comparable in
each version of the illusion, the subjective experience of finger
presence was different in the two cases. In the missing finger con-
dition, participants typically reported somatic experiences such as
numbness, which attenuated the strength of the reported tactile
sensations. In addition, in the missing finger condition the per-
ceived form of the invisible finger was not fixed and at certain
times it was reported to change size and shape. These perceptions
were often accompanied by a sense of “wrongness” and a recog-
nition that these sensations should not happen. This was not the
case in the standard, finger-present, version of the RHI, in which
normal feelings of body awareness are experienced as located in
the rubber hand.
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In the current study 93% of the participants reported that they
felt their finger extending out from the stump of the rubber hand
and this is comparable to the incidence of a continued experience
of a removed body part in amputees, which is as high as 98%
in some samples (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998). Within the
general phantom limb experience, however, there is a range of
more specific phenomena that are only seen among subgroups
of amputees. Some, for example, can describe the shape, size,
and range of movement of the phantom (Katz, 1992; Richard-
son et al., 2006), whereas others only have a more vague sense
of the phantom’s presence. Some, in addition to the sense of the
phantom’s presence, have other sensations, such as pain or tin-
gling. The prevalence of these more specific types of experience
has been difficult to establish in amputees, but similar experiences
were seen in some of the missing finger RHI participants. A large
subsection of these participants could also describe the perceived
shape and form of the finger even though they could not see it
and additional sensations such as numbness, tingling, and other
paresthesias were reported by around 25% of people. The miss-
ing finger illusion elicits a range of sensory phenomena which are
associated with PLPh and may, therefore, provide a useful method
for investigating the underlying mechanisms of some phantom
limb experience.
However not all aspects of PLPh were replicated by this illusion.
Firstly, the variation in position of the phantom and movement
of the phantom, both of which occur in some real phantom limb
cases, could not be elicited by the illusion due to the static posi-
tion of the rubber hand. Secondly, noticeably absent from the
range of experiences reported by our participants is any feeling
of physical pain due to the missing finger illusion. This may be
unsurprising given that none of our participants had actually
undergone a traumatic amputation of their ring finger. However, it
may also suggest that different mechanisms underlie non-painful
and painful sensory phenomena. It is now well documented that
phantom limb pain after upper limb amputation is associated with
cortical re-organization of the primary somatosensory and motor
cortices of the brain (Lotze et al., 2001; MacIver et al., 2008). Func-
tional brain imaging studies show that activation of the lip/face
area extends beyond its cortical boundaries to incorporate cortex
normally devoted to processing information from the hand/arm.
Furthermore, the intensity of the pain is positively correlated with
the extent of re-organization, which can be reversed using an
intervention based on mental imagery where amputees imagine
moving the phantom limb (MacIver et al., 2008). At present it
is unclear what causes such extensive re-organization to occur,
although there are several theories (see Subedi and Grossberg,
2011, for a recent review). One theory suggests that it is the lack
of afferent input to primary sensory cortex, which results in re-
organization as the brain utilizes redundant cortex. This highly
influential theory has provided the rationale for treatments for
phantom limb pain, such as the mirror box (Ramachandran and
Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996), which aim to restore afferent sen-
sory input and provide motor feedback, although mirror therapy
in general has had mixed results in randomized controlled trials
(Brodie et al., 2007; for a discussion of this see Moseley et al., 2008).
The phantom pain and sensation may have its onset imme-
diately or years after the amputation. There are reports of two
peak periods of onset, the first within a month and the second
a year after amputation (Schley et al., 2008). If the pain associ-
ated with phantom limbs is due to cortical re-organization, we
would not expect to see this in the short time period over which
we tested participants. Non-painful phenomena widely reported in
the phantom limb literature and elicited in our study likely precede
the development of pain, which takes longer to establish. One pos-
sibility is that non-painful phenomena are dependent upon altered
multisensory correlations following amputation, which occur over
shorter time periods. Cortical re-organization may then occur as a
response to these altered multisensory inputs as the brain attempts
to re-associate or adapt cortical areas to the objective form of the
body. This proposed mechanism for the development of phantom
limb pain is based on the idea of the “body schema” (Head and
Holmes, 1911). The body schema can be thought of as a template
of the entire body in the brain. Any change to the body, such as
an amputation, results in the perception of a phantom limb. More
recently, Melzack (1989) has proposed that the body schema is
formed through a “neuromatrix,” which is a network of neurons
that integrate inputs from the somatosensory, limbic, and visual
and thalamocortical regions of the brain and a “neurosignature,”
which is the patterns of brain activity that are constantly updated
based on the conscious awareness of the bodily self (see also Ian-
netti and Mouraux, 2010). Together, they form output patterns,
which can determine pain and meaningful bodily experience, such
that deprivation of sensory input from the limbs leads to disrup-
tion of the neuromatrix, an abnormal neurosignature, and the
development of pain. In addition to sensory-motor cortex, the
parietal and frontal lobes have also been shown to be involved
in both the normal and abnormal multisensory representation of
the limb (Lloyd et al., 2002; Ehrsson et al., 2004) and may underlie
phantom sensations including pain (McCabe et al., 2005). Future
studies using functional brain imaging should help to determine
whether cortical re-organization occurs due to an absence of sen-
sory input or due to an altered pattern of multisensory integration
and whether this correlates with subjective pain.
It may appear that, in addition to the absence of pain, another
difference between the missing finger illusion and phantom limbs
is that the illusion is clearly elicited by external stimulation pro-
vided by the experimenter’s mimed stroking of the space where
the missing finger would be whereas phantom limbs seem to be
the result of internal processes and representations rather than
external stimulation. We believe, however, that the current find-
ings point to the possibility that phantom limbs are not the result
of purely internal processes but that they too, like the missing
finger, are influenced by sensory information coming from the
external environment. There are many anecdotal reports suggest-
ing that amputees can feel alterations the phantom experience as a
result of interaction with the environment. For example, a phan-
tom limb may recede or telescope to avoid obstacles (Giummarra
et al., 2010), textures can be felt through the phantom (Björkman
et al., 2010; Weeks et al., 2010). In addition, treatments which are
seen to “stimulate” the phantom have been reported to be suc-
cessful (Huang et al., 2009). In these instances the experience of
the phantom limb is felt to change and the amputee attributes it
to some physical object seen near to the body. When a sample of
amputees who reported PLPh were surveyed about the perceived
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causes of their phantom experiences, the weather was selected
by 47% and the next most commonly selected cause was stress
which was selected by 8% (Sherman et al., 1984). These examples
demonstrate that amputees sometimes attribute external causes
to changes to their PLPh. There is currently no explanation of
how this could occur. During normal embodiment, visual cues
do not have to be seen on the body to elicit a change in somatic
experience. Just seeing a threatening object near the body elicits
fear and a physiological stress response and activates parietal brain
regions encoding peripersonal space (Lloyd et al., 2006). This abil-
ity has been related to the existence of peripersonal space, a region
around the body where visual cues are processed as relevant for the
body either in terms of reaching, avoidance, or threat detection.
Peripersonal space is demonstrated by the existence of cross modal
interactions between vision and touch. PLPh may occur due to the
same cross modal interactions that support normal embodiment
but in a different situation than has ever been experienced before,
i.e., when part of the body is missing.
The body changes continuously as we grow up and grow old and
the body schema must also change to accommodate these changes.
Many experiments demonstrate that changes to the experienced
form of the body occur by resolving discrepancies between sen-
sory information. In the extending nose procedure a participant
can feel their nose becoming longer when reaching forward and
touching another person’s nose whilst a third person touches the
participant’s nose (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998). Vibrating
a muscle tendon can also lead to the illusory perception that a limb
is becoming longer (Lackner, 1988). In these examples the body
percept changes because sensory experiences that reference limb
position are incongruent. The same perceptual adaptation most
likely underlies the changes in size and shape reported during the
missing finger illusion. Participants also report changes in the size
of the hand during the standard RHI but the perceptual changes
are limited to the visual form of the seen hand, which places con-
straints on the way that embodiment can be manipulated. For
example, during embodiment illusions a participant feels their
finger or arm stretch when they see it stretch, but the illusion
of ownership is lost if part of the body is completely detached
(Newport and Preston, 2010; Preston and Newport, 2012). In the
present study, the form of the invisible finger changed very quickly
and the same participant could report a range of alterations that
were attributed to the seen location of the experimenter’s finger.
Touch information, from both a tactile and visual senses, shapes
the finger percept but when a hand-like object is embodied it is
the properties of the object that are adopted. Conversely in the
disappearing hand illusion, when there is no body form to see and
visual and tactile inputs are absent, there is an absence of embod-
iment, such that participants cannot feel or locate that body part
(Newport and Gilpin, 2011). This situation corresponds to a com-
mon sense view of the sensory input that one would expect to
be available to an amputee but, in a phenomenological sense, the
experience of a phantom limb is more similar to experiences in
the missing finger illusion. Collectively this suggests that residual
sensory information in the context of an unseen body form may
contribute to phantom experience.
The invisible finger phenomena demonstrate how awareness of
peripersonal space cannot be thought of as something completely
separate from the sense of embodiment. Indeed, they demonstrate
that areas of objectively empty space near the body can themselves
become part of the subjective embodiment experience. The idea of
reciprocal lines of influence connecting sense of embodiment and
perception of nearby space is consistent with evidence suggesting
that the representation of space near the body changes following
amputation. When comparing distances in the landmark position
judgment task (Makin et al., 2010), amputees use the intact side
of their body in near, but not far, space judgments, suggesting
that they come to neglect the space near the missing hand. Space
representation is dependent upon body understanding so when
it changes, either through illusions, such as the RHI, or through
physical alterations to body form such as amputation, the way that
space around the body is represented also changes.
An illustration of the intimate connection between the sense
of embodiment and peripersonal space can be found in the work
of Moseley et al. (2008). A consequence of the RHI is that the
temperature of the participant’s real hand is lowered when own-
ership is transferred to the rubber hand (Moseley et al., 2008). A
fall in limb temperature is also measured in CRPS, where dam-
age to the nerves causes people to experience chronic pain and
numbness and tingling sensations in the affected body part. These
patients show altered tactile processing such that they prioritize
tactile information in the unaffected hand over the affected hand.
But this effect is reversed when the hands are crossed over the body
and tactile input in the affected hand is now prioritized because
it rests in the unaffected side of space (Moseley et al., 2009). This
again demonstrates that how we experience our own bodies is not
just a matter of what is happening within the body itself, but also
is affected by the body’s relationship with surrounding objects and
spaces.
In this experiment we have demonstrated that an experience
similar to that of the phantom limb can be induced in intact par-
ticipants using a variation of the RHI. We have also shown, through
the use of first-person methods, how this experience reproduces
various phenomena associated with phantom limbs, although, sig-
nificantly, not the pain or discomfort that is sometimes associated
with phantom limbs. The way in which the experienced invisible
finger is felt to grow in length or to otherwise alter its shape as
a function of the way in which the experimenter mimicked the
stroking of the missing finger indicates how the sense of embod-
iment is altered by the body’s relationship with its surroundings.
Given the similarities between this illusion and PLPh, it may be
the case that phantom limbs, and the way that they alter their size
and shape over time, are not only a function of an internal body
representation but are influenced by relationships within periper-
sonal space. This, of course, is a matter requiring much further
research, but is nevertheless suggestive of possible influences on
the way that phantom limbs change over time.
The mediation of sense of embodiment by perception of the
surrounding environment has wide philosophical implications,
as it suggests that the boundary between self and world is not
something absolute and clear-cut. This is a view that has long
been advocated by thinkers in the phenomenological tradition,
such as Merleau-Ponty (1958) who noted that foreign objects
frequently become part of the subjectively experienced body:
“The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him. . .
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its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope
and active radius of touch” (p. 165). The blind person is, nev-
ertheless, still aware of the stick, just not directly as an object,
but indirectly via other objects: “In the exploration of things, the
length of the stick does not enter expressly as a middle term: the
blind man is rather aware of it through the position of objects
than the position of objects through it.” (pp 165–166). I am,
in other words, “conscious of my body via the world” (p. 94).
The experiences generated by the RHI in the present study are
consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis of
embodiment.
CONCLUSION
In this study we have been able to create an analog of the phan-
tom limb experience in intact participants by using a variation of
the RHI in which one of the fingers was missing from the rubber
hand. Analysis of first-person reports not only indicated a sense
of presence of the missing finger, but the experience among some
participants of a number of more specific sensations, such as tin-
gling, associated with phantom limbs. The missing finger version
of the RHI may, therefore, provide a means of investigating aspects
of embodiment that are difficult to investigate in phantom limb
patients themselves. In addition, the way in which the perceived
size and shape of the invisible finger altered in the present study
indicates that sense of embodiment depends on incoming sensory
information from peripersonal space. This is consistent with pre-
vious phenomenological work on embodiment and suggests that
aspects of the phantom limb experience itself may depend cru-
cially on perception of surrounding space and interactions with
the objects in it.
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